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1. Reasoning under uncertainty 
In school we only learn to reason by deduction or under the 
condition of a finite set of solutions, because tasks are constructed 
in such a way as to grant a just evaluation of students. In real life 
many decisions must be taken under uncertainty, as the world is 
ruled by an infinite number of influences and random events.1 
Work situations present many tasks in which one can fail in spite 
of the best analytical mind and the sincerest effort. The opposite 
can also come true: People are successful by sheer luck. Reasoning 
and decision-making in criminal investigations, namely in the pre-
trial phase when the ideas about what has happened are still vague, 
are paradigmatic for all case work, be it in medicine, psychology, 
management, economics, history, or journalism. The raw material 
treated in cases contains photos, drawings and descriptions of facts 
(reports, depositions, letters, etc.) revealed in the context of a ques-
tioned incident. What has been detected may be incomplete and 
may contain random noise, traces that are unrelated to the incident. 
Analyzing images and texts as evidence is mostly done by simple 
reading and looking at the pictures, taking notes about whatever 
salient characteristic the reader happens to perceive. The analysis of 
 
1  Michael Pidd: Tools for thinking. Modelling in management and science, 
Chichester 32009, 31, 46. 
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the available materials of evidence is an ill-defined task, indeed. 
Where does one begin? What procedure must one follow? When is 
the intelligence gathered from the material sufficient for a decision 
about tracks to be pursued as leads, and which tracks seem to be 
less promising?  
The ultimate probandum consists of a larger narrative about 
what happened in terms of antecedents of the situation as well as 
human, natural and technical influences on it during a certain 
timespan. It is a deterministic sequence of causes and influences 
within a large set of unknown random events. The aim is to explain 
the detected pieces of evidence of a case in the best possible way. 
With a series of experiments in different settings we looked at the 
way case-analyses are being executed in practice. A series of simpli-
fied recipes about interpretation are commonly called upon in work 
situations: (1) distinguishing «facts» from «interpretation»; (2) con-
structing working hypotheses; (3) determining if the «facts» match 
the «hypothesis» or not; (4) «improving successively» the working 
hypotheses within the intelligence cycle. Unfortunately, these com-
mon rules of analysis contain many pitfalls. 
This study aims at providing illustrations for the intricacies of 
abduction under complete uncertainty, so as to go beyond the natural 
way of doing things and offer some insight into how a more profi-
cient analysis might be accomplished. Thus, the above-mentioned 
naïve routine for case-interpretation needs to be replaced by a better 
heuristic procedure. Then again practitioners rarely have the time 
to enter a complex philosophical debate on epistemology. Most of 
them prefer a set of bullet-proof instructions. This study - including 
the test case - intends to provide a better set of critical thinking rules 
for case analyses and serve as materials for educational purposes. 
1.1 Questioning common recipes 
Unfortunately, there is no pure perception, free of any previous 
assumptions. The underlying error of this postulation is called 
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naïve realism. The idea of working hypotheses reflects Russell’s 
notion of the hypothesis as a tool to separate plausible from implau-
sible assumptions: «Our theory of truth must be such as to admit of 
its opposite, falsehood. […] the truth or falsehood of a belief always 
depends upon something which lies outside the belief itself».2 Fur-
thermore it is customary in casework to confront all preliminary 
inferences to the available observanda, to see how well they fit. From 
today’s epistemology this procedure is based on a naïve under-
standing of correspondence theories of «truth».  
In a first step naïve correspondence theories can be improved 
by introducing their most advanced version, Tarski’s theorem and 
its consequences.3 It postulates a first cognitive level (the so-called 
«object level») at which facts are observed, and propositions about 
these facts are formulated. A second level (the meta-plane) consists 
of a truth-function T about the object level. A proposition p about 
facts F (represented as ‘F’ by some kind of language corresponding 
to signs) is logically considered «true» if and only if it corresponds 
to the facts F, so:  
(T): p(‘F’) is «true» if and only if F.  
Tarski has stripped the semantic notion of «truth» of all its former 
absoluteness and added precision to the correspondence theories. 
Propositions are not contained in the information given by the facts 
themselves; they are educated guesses about the hidden causes or 
structures behind those facts. No proposition p about F can be called 
«true» if no fact F can be established. Several propositions p1 – pj 
about the same set of facts F can all be considered a «match» if they 
correspond to all (known) facts. «False» propositions contradict 
some of the facts F or do not explain all of them. This semantic 
theorem is not uncontested: It does not distinguish between facts 
 
2  Bertrand Russell: The problems of philosophy, Oxford 1912, chap. 12: 
Truth and falsehood, 89. 
3  Alfred Tarski: Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grund-
lagen der Semantik, in: Gunnar Skirbekk (Hg.): Wahrheitstheorien, Frank-
furt a.M. 1977, 140–188 (143-145). 
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and the information contained in them and it only compares one 
theory with another.4  
Facts (in the Latin sense of facta) consist of documented traces 
of the past which were collected to analyze a given case. According 
to the basics of semiotics, the observandum (a fact) should be ana-
lyzed by referring to units of perception. Those are called signs of 
evidence. A sign may be a carrier of information. It consists of an 
outer appearance (its form), which transports possible inner mean-
ings.5 It is important to recognize that the level of naïve realism 
cannot be skipped. What can be perceived on a document has to be 
made explicit. But then such (seemingly) direct signals arriving to 
eyes and ears need to be enhanced within a next layer of theory 
which is semiotics. In semiotics Tarski’s notion of a «truth function» 
is replaced by Eco’s warning that signs can only be interpreted 
within their context.6 In open-ended problems this context is not 
given by a fixed set of observanda, it needs to be reconstructed itself. 
The reasoning problem under complete uncertainty can be cap-
tured by two null-hypotheses, often taken for granted in practice. 
With the two working hypotheses we intended to test practitioners 
work experimentally in order to illustrate what results from naïve 
recipes concerning the art of interpretation: 
H01: Inferences that seem to correspond to the available obser-
vanda («matches») are helpful in the way of finding more 
clues to the presumed (yet unknown) real events; 
H02: Inferences seeming to contradict the observanda («non-
matches») will not provide further insights into the pre-
sumed real events and can be dismissed. 
 
4  Another criticism holds that Tarski’s theorem fails to address causality. 
Unfortunately, there is no room here to develop a philosophical debate of 
correspondence theories.  
5  Charles Sanders Peirce: Pragmatism and pragmaticism (1931), in: Col-
lected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, V, Cambridge MA 1978.  
6  Umberto Eco: Zeichen. Einführung in einen Begriff, Frankfurt a.M. 1977, 
chap. 5.19. 
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As part of the above-mentioned routines, many experts recom-
mend using the intelligence cycle.7 As an iterative process of finding 
new materials and explaining what has been observed, conjectures 
get gradually adapted until they fit the evidence.8 Let us see what 
this kind of reasoning typically amounts to. People, having a vague 
notion of a continuum ranging from totally false to one hundred 
percent true, tend to think that a proposition is modified step by 
step with updates so as to contain ever more «truth» and less «false-
hood» than before. Each revised proposed theory pi+1 supersedes pi 
and considers another set of facts than its predecessor.9 Practitioners 
working the case will judge the plausibility of pi by examining all 
possible consequences derived from it. As soon as new evidence 
Ei+1 is found, pi can either be confirmed as pi = pi+1 which strength-
ens the belief in it, or it can be overturned or modified in the light 
of Ei+1, to be replaced with an updated new theory pi+1(«Ei+1»). 
Along this process older propositions and theories will be rejected 
and go into a «garbage can» set of bad matches ¬Mi. At stage i, they 
would be considered as «mistaken» in natural language while some 
pieces of evidence or signs would be considered as random noise or 
artifacts. Thus, Ei can contain elements that are dismissed in Ei+1. 
Many people believe naïvely that this process would finally con-
verge to «finding out» the unknown «ground truth» GT after a finite 
number of n iterations, resulting in all the necessary evidence En to 
terminate the process: GT = pn(«En»). 
Unfortunately, this common heuristic amounts to Popper’s idea 
of verisimilitude,10 defining a theory’s content as a class of logical 
consequences resulting from it. These should be divided into the 
truth content (Ct) and falsity content (Cf). The verisimilitude V of a 
 
 7  Olivier Ribaux, Amélie Baylon, Claude Roux, Olivier Delémont, Eric Lock, 
Christian Zingg, Pierre Margot: Intelligence-led crime scene processing, 
Part II: Intelligence and crime scene examination, in: Forensic Science 
International 199/1 (2010) 63–71 (68). 
 8  David A. Schum: The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning, 
Evanston IL 2001, 45. 
 9  Ibid., 71, 463–468. 
10  Karl Popper: Conjectures and refutations (1963), London 2008, 317. 
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proposition pi was calculated as the difference between its truth con-
tent and its falsity content. The formula V(pi) = Ct(pi) - Cf(pi) was 
intended to measure the value of rival propositions. As we tend to 
associate verisimilitude with the (measurable) type-I error in signifi-
cance testing of statistical hypotheses, the idea seems plausible, but 
this a misunderstanding. Verisimilitude combines truth with the 
content of a proposition whereas probability combines truth with 
randomness, that is lack of content, of a proposition.11 In 1974 Miller 
and Tichý - independently from each other - found that the truth 
content Ct as a set cannot be separated from the falsity content Cf. 
Thus, the falseness of a hypothesis cannot be measured.12 Every at-
tempt to quantify or to estimate it, may lead to confusion. Inci-
dentally, Popper’s work on verisimilitude is in itself an example of 
an important hypothesis that is formally false while successfully 
leading to a valid discovery.  
If we accepted Miller’s and Tichý’s result as a basis for practice, 
no rejection of any proposition would ever be possible in criminal 
investigation (and other fields). Skepticism is necessary for any 
scientific endeavor, but it provides no practical instructions regard-
ing by what to replace the criticized approach. In work situations 
we cannot do without using the iterative verisimilitude approach as 
a heuristic tool. Categorizing ideas represents common reasoning in 
teams, although experienced practitioners warn young colleagues 
to not dismiss working inferences lightly and to always search for 
alternative explanations. For as long as the inquiry can produce sig-
nificant amounts of relevant new evidence for any active working 
hypothesis the intelligence cycle is useful. The very process of 
strengthening and weakening of different conjectures with the dis-
covery of formerly unknown facts is in itself evidence for as long as 
the inquiry is correctly conducted into all directions. However, 
 
11  Ibid., 322. 
12  David Miller: Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude, in: The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25/2 (1974) 166–177. 
 Pavel Tichý: On Popper’s definitions of verisimilitude. The British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 25/2 (1974) 155–160. 
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when the investigation stalls, or when it is conducted only into one 
single direction, then the flaws of these heuristics become manifest. 
1.2 Training in the perception and the analysis of signs of 
evidence 
Schum pointed out that «the success […] in generating new and 
important hypotheses depends to a great extend upon how well we 
have marshaled or organized the thoughts and the evidence we 
have».13 Unfortunately, many analysts fall into the trap of adopting 
their own first guess or some arbitrary piece of contextual infor-
mation as a reference point. Cognitive biases are a well-known 
Achilles’ heel and compromise the experts’ objectivity. In order to 
improve perception and interpretation of pictures and written state-
ments some participants learned to apply a heuristic named System-
atic Analysis (SA) consisting of five critical thinking rules derived 
from epistemology, forensic science and cognitive psychology.14 
Comparable to a microscope it can only treat one observandum at a 
time, not great quantities of material. 
I.  Find schemata and models for the observandum. 
II.  Observe formal aspects of the signs, not only their presumed 
contents. 
III.  Dissect the object into its structural components according to 
models, observe each one. 
IV.  Note inconsistencies, anomalies, and contradictions. 
V.  List what seems to be missing or superfluous according to 
models. 
 
13  D. A. Schum: The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning, 451. 
14  Henriette Haas, Patrick Tönz, Jutta Gubser-Ernst, Maja Pisarzewska 
Fuerst: Analyzing the psychological and social contents of evidence – 
experimental comparison between guessing, naturalistic observation 
and systematic analysis, in: Journal of Forensic Sciences 60/3 (2015) 
659–668. 
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Those rules address all dimensions required by Walker as a 
minimum for any theory about uncertainty,15 namely linguistics 
with rules I., II. and III., causality with rules I., III. and V. and logic 
with rule IV. The condition to declare one’s standpoint added by 
Schum,16 is fulfilled by using rule I. to identify models and schemata 
for the observandum. In practice the procedure – when applied to se-
lected potentially meaningful pictures, documents or texts – collects 
the bricks to construct an inference network later in the investiga-
tion. It can point to questions to ask suspects or witnesses; and it can 
show new promising tracks. Finally, it may offer circumstantial 
evidence about mens rea, about intellectual or professional capacities, 
psychiatric symptoms and other psychological aspects of a person. 
It should be mentioned that some of the advice contained in the five 
rules has been published earlier.17 
2. Method: comparing analyses with the ground truth 
Knowing the ground truth is only possible in an experimental 
situation when tasks can be constructed around some given well 
documented event. Only the experiment can provide insights into 
the pitfalls of real-life situations. In order to find out more about the 
interpretation of texts and pictures several groups of students and 
professionals received six test cases to analyze, either before being 
trained with the five rules-algorithm or after that. The first question 
of the study to resolve is how to classify their answers. It is the basic 
question of how to judge working hypotheses: what is useful and 
what is not? 
 
15  Vern R. Walker: Theories of uncertainty, in: Marilyn MacCrimmon, Peter 
Tillers (eds.): The dynamics of judicial proof, Heidelberg 2002, 197–236 
(204). 
16  D. A. Schum: The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning, 45. 
17  Ibid., 72, 97, 105. 
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2.1 The test case 
For the purpose of this study we selected the most difficult test 
case (among the six) which exemplifies the challenges of analyzing 
complex, open-ended problems. Each case has a ground truth GT 
around which it was constructed.  
The elephant drawing 
The drawing below is meant to represent an elephant. The little 
figure beside the foreleg of the animal is supposed to be the author 
of the drawing himself. On demand of the research-team the par-
ticipant of a scientific study in 1959 had drawn this picture. He was 
an adult male who was neither physically nor mentally suffering 
from impairments or illnesses during the test. What was the matter 
with this man that he drew like this? How would you defend your 
hypothesis? 
ã Gregory & Wallace.18 Reprinted with the permission of the authors 
 
18  The reference is revealed in footnote 25, so as not to spoil the riddle here 
already.  
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2.2 Participants 
A total of N = 259 participants took the elephant task: n = 155 
were psychology students (aged M = 26.5 years [SD = 5.6], female : 
male ratio = 79:21, with M = 8.6 semesters [SD = 3.0], 48% untrained 
vs 52% trained), n = 30 were law students (aged M = 24.9 years [SD 
= 3.3], female : male ratio = 63:37, with M = 8.1 semesters [SD = 2.0], 
40% untrained vs 60% trained) and n = 74 were Court and Prosecu-
tion professionals (aged M = 37.1 years [SD = 6.6], with M = 6.7 years 
of work experience in criminal investigation [SD = 6.7], female : male 
ratio = 60:40, 42% untrained vs 58% trained). Two additional psy-
chology students had heard about the drawing and were excluded. 
The first 80 participants (only psychology students) had 30 minutes 
to analyze the elephant riddle, whereas all other participants had 
only 14 minutes (students n = 105 and professionals n = 74). 
2.3 Rating the inferences’ success in finding out the ground truth 
Participants’ working propositions h about a test-case can be 
evaluated with respect to their matching the facts from the ex-ante 
perspective but also according to their relevance for detecting the 
GT from hindsight (ex-post). Those can never be distinguished in 
real life – according to the reasons for skepticism. Both perspectives 
can be divided into good and bad answers. Under Tarski’s a corre-
spondence or match (h Î M) is good while a non-match (h Î ¬M) is 
bad, but according to hindsight a relevant answer (h Î R) is useful 
and an irrelevant one (h Î ¬R) is worthless. Non-matches were 
qualified with the downward modal expressions «implausible» 
and «impossible». Good matches were qualified with the upward 
modals «plausible» and «necessary». The latter can only be based 
on universal laws.  
Relevance is defined as the dependency of the ground truth GT 
under the hypothesis h (h = any hypothetical proposition): h is rele-
vant for GT if and only if Pr(GT|h) ≠ Pr(GT). Relevant inferences are 
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the GT itself (that is the ultimate probandum), some partial explana-
tions of the GT, and eliminations of what did not happen.19 Table 1 
contains the Cartesian product of ratings. 
 
Table 1 
Cartesian Product of Propositions h Between Correspondence to the Evidence M 
and Relevance R 
 
Legend Ω   Set of all propositions h 𝑀 ⊂ Ω  Subset of all matches (necessary, plausible) based on evidence, with 𝑀 ∪¬	𝑀 = Ω 𝑅 ⊂ Ω Subset of all relevant inferences (necessary, plausible, implausible) con-
sidering GT, with 𝑅 ∪¬	𝑅 = 𝛺  
 
19  D. A. Schum: The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning, 172, 96. 
   Relevance R  
 
Match M 
Relevant propositions: h Î R 
Pr(GT|h) ≠ Pr(GT) 
 
 
Irrelevant propositions: h Ï R 
Pr(GT|h) = Pr(GT) 
 
    
h Î M Good Matches 
modal: necessary 
× non-misleading correct 
eliminations 
× misleading correct 
eliminations 
× necessary partial 
explanations (PE) 
 
* 
modal: plausible 
× ground truth (GT) 
× broadsides (contains GT) 
 
 
 
 
× mistaken but plausible full  
explanations (FE) 
× irrelevant partial 
explanations (seeing ghosts 
in random noise) 
    
h Ï M  Bad Matches 
modal: implausible 
× implausible but relevant 
full explanations (FE) 
× implausible eliminations 
of relevant hypotheses 
(equivalent of dismissed 
GT/PE) 
 × irrelevant implausible full 
explanations FE (bad 
observations) 
× irrefutable ideas 
 
 
modal: impossible * 
 × pseudo-reasoning 
(speculation) 
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The intersection of M and R contains all relevant propositions 
h which match. M Ç R includes the ground truth GT, all correct 
eliminations plus all partial explanations which show certain as-
pects of the GT. In this category we also counted good propositions 
that participants had stated and later dismissed, if they were rele-
vant and plausible. All propositions h outside of R but inside M 
seem plausible ideas ex-ante, yet mistaken in retrospect (h Î M AND 
h Ï R). The classification of specific inferences given by the partici-
pants will be shown in Table 2.  
Starting with the description of the rating process this study 
intends to shed light on the difficulties of the evaluation of working 
inferences. Sentences in natural language are often ambiguous or 
vague.20 For example, not all answers were stated as falsifiable sen-
tences. Participants’ answers going into the right direction were 
given half points. The answering sheets provided an observation-
section and a section for the final (best) working hypothesis. Often 
participants would not separate complex inferences from simple de-
scriptions, or they would state several hypothetical scenarios in-
stead of one, or else they did not respect the correct sections. When 
several inferences were written in the hypothesis section, we classi-
fied all of them according to Tarski and relevance. False inferences 
mentioned only in the observation section were not counted be-
cause, following the instructions, we can assume that the participant 
had rejected them. But we did count additional matching or rele-
vant conjectures in the observation section. This procedure granted 
that those participants who had decided on one or more favored 
inference (as required) received less wrongness points than those 
who had violated instructions by writing only into the observation 
section without specifying their best guesses. 
Another problem of interpretation is that «inferences can 
usually be decomposed to different levels of granularity, and we 
are often faced with a choice about the level of detail at which the 
analysis will be made».21 At the extreme end of granularity, when 
 
20  Ibid., 263–265. 
21  Ibid., 5 (see also 90, 492). 
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the material is dissected into minute pieces (used for any human 
communication) and recomposed with an inference network of 
subjective meaning, the error of discovering ghosts within random 
sequences can occur (as the «Bible-code» fallacy exposed in 1999).22 
In this study we treat only inferences which offer an explanation 
going beyond a mere description of the visible details. Those will be 
addressed in another study. According to previous experimentation 
the application of the five rules does increase the amount of details 
observed considerably and improve the abductions slightly.23 
Trying to reproduce the ex-ante situation by classifying infer-
ences according to how well they fit the available case material, 
showed that a distinction between good and fair matches was fuzzy. 
Participants’ guesses often implied social and natural scenarios con-
sisting of several nested propositions. Some would match the facts 
seamlessly, others only almost. Some matches were inferences lack-
ing specificity. They were «too bulky on the body of facts», so we 
called them «broadsides». At the end we chose the best fit among 
all matches, the one that explained every detail, and would consti-
tute the lead in a real investigation. This was fairly easy. Many par-
ticipants excluded scenarios seemingly plausible at first sight but 
not matching the facts after careful observation. These eliminations 
were deductions from the laws of nature and were counted among 
matches. Next, we found partial explanations. They explained one 
part of the observandum as a necessary consequence of the laws of 
nature (for instance «the man has never seen an elephant in his 
life»). Partial explanations did not attempt to explain some other 
important aspects of the case (why not draw the head?). In other test 
cases (not discussed here) subjects would draw inferences based on 
statistics, not on the evidence at hand. This was qualified as a 
coincidental relevant match. Finally, some participants explicitly 
dismissed a good idea in the course of their analysis (dismissed hits 
 
22  Brendan McKay, Dror Bar-Natan, Maya Bar-Hillel, Gil Kalai: Solving the 
bible code puzzle, in: Statistical Science 14/2 (1999) 150–173. 
23  H. Haas et al: Analyzing the psychological and social contents of evi-
dence. 
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or partial explanations). All inferences providing at least some 
matching aspect were included in the set of good matches M. The 
complementary set of bad matches was easier to define: They were 
marked by a lack of close observation of the material, contradicted 
everyday experience and contained many speculative elements. 
Farfetched speculations were counted as impossible matches when 
participants overelaborated on their main inference and added wild 
ideas unrelated to any facts (for instance «the man was afraid of the 
cold war»). Tautologies and arguments beside the point did not 
occur at all. Vagueness (for instance «he wanted to draw something 
else») and all-encompassing inferences are non-refutable ideas 
according to Russell.24 We counted them among irrelevant bad 
matches. All in all, the demarcations between categories are not 
very clear-cut and would raise endless discussions in practice.  
The hindsight (ex-post situation) contains relevant versus irrele-
vant inferences with respect to the GT. The first category captures 
the ultimate probandum, the hits of the ground truth, obviously good 
matches (h Î R AND h Î M). In other test cases some participants 
had the good idea of the GT but dismissed it later. Then there was 
the category of plausible matches ex-ante which turn out to be untrue 
ex-post. Thus, promising tracks can be misleading. We did not detect 
any irrelevant partial explanations in this material, but theoretically 
they can be made in good faith as explanations for random influences 
affecting the case’s evidence. Finally, we divided the bad matches 
into relevant and irrelevant ones. If a badly matching idea can be 
relevant indeed, then the exclusion of this idea is a misleading elimi-
nation though it is correct in itself. The double-negation category 
«badly matching elimination» is an equivalent of a dismissed hit or 
dismissed correct partial explanation, thus relevant. An implausible 
elimination that is irrelevant is the same as a farfetched speculation.  
 
24  B. Russell: The problems of philosophy, 89. 
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2.4 Inter-Rater-Reliability of the product between matches and 
relevance 
To examine the reliability of the Cartesian rating schema pro-
posed by the first author, she and the second author independently 
rated a total of 50 participants’ analyses of each test case. We meas-
ured the reliability of ratings with Crohnbach’s alpha (standardized). 
Statistics were calculated with SAS and are reported in Table 2. 
3. Results 
Case study results are often presented from hindsight mention-
ing errors and pitfalls they encountered during the investigation in 
retrospect. Here we present results so as to enable readers to expe-
rience both the challenge of the ex-ante perspective and the illusory 
easiness of the case-solutions from ex-post. Analysis 1 illustrates 
the frequent lack of precise descriptions despite 30 minutes time to 
ponder over the problem. Not astonishingly the hypothesis is vague 
and poorly adapted to what can be detected in the picture. 
 
Analysis 1 done by an untrained ♀ student (30 min.) 
Observations 
Very abstract drawing, hardly recognizable for what it is. As if a child had 
done it. Elephant has very long legs. The man is hardly recognizable. You 
don’t know what is the elephant’s fore side and what its hind side. Looks 
like the man is holding the elephant. The elephant seems very powerful, like 
a monster. 
Hypothesis 
Looks as if something oppressing was on his mind, something above him 
exercising power over him. 
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3.1 Revealing the ground truth and an optimal analysis 
Analysis 2 came closest to the truth. The author immediately 
dipped into her knowledge of patterns in clinical neuropsychology, 
however without delivering any description.  
 
Analysis 2 done by an untrained ♀ student (14 min.) 
Observations 
- Maybe he has bad imagination and cannot draw very well in general.  
- Mental status normal: either this man is indeed totally healthy, or else 
something has been overlooked. When it comes to agnosias they are of-
ten hard to discover in clinical exams even today. Agnosia can cause 
problems with drawing, because patients cannot image and recognize 
objects (depending on which kind of agnosia). 
¦ in 1959 there was not enough research about it (about agnosias). 
- Maybe he was an artist with a special technique. 
- Or he has never seen an elephant, knowing only that it is big (2nd 
hypothesis) (and is bad at drawing). 
- Maybe he has bad imagination and cannot draw very well in general.  
Hypothesis 
He may have a neurological condition (for instance agnosia) not known 
enough to diagnose in 1959.  
 
No one has ever found the key to this puzzle; a rare scenario 
indeed. In 1959 a middle-aged man who had been congenitally 
blind and had never seen an elephant in his life underwent surgery 
for cataracts and recovered full sight. Obviously, he was inexpe-
rienced at drawing. Before taking him to the zoo a team of cognitive 
psychologists visited him for their research on perception and 
schemata and asked him to make a drawing of the animal.25 
 
25  Richard L. Gregory, Jean G. Wallace: Recovery from early blindness – 
a case study, in: Experimental Psychology Society Monograph 2 (1963) 
65–129 (96). 
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Congenitally blind people often suffer from neuropsychological 
dysfunctions and autistic traits,26 but in 1959 there were no tests 
available to measure them, therefore he was considered undisturbed 
then. Here we present a model solution (by the authors): 
 
Model Analysis of the elephant case according to the SA-algorithm  
Observations 
1) Comparisons with scientific drawings, children’s, cave-men’s, patients 
with different disorders and persons under the influence of drugs. 
2) Pencil-drawing on white paper with an insecure hand, there is no back-
ground and it lacks perspective. Spaces were filled by crude and strong 
pencil strokes back and forth.  
3) The elephant consists of a rump, four legs sticking out, no feet, a trunk 
in front and a tail in its back. Both look quite the same. The animal’s 
head (skull, face, ears, tusks) is missing altogether. The little man consists 
of a rump and a head, limbs are only partially sketched. The man’s face 
is an empty circle.  
4) Even though this is a most primitive drawing, the elephant’s limbs are 
connected to its rump, the lines filling out the rump do not trespass the 
outer limits of the animal and the proportions between the heights of the 
man and the elephant are more or less correct. 
5) The missing head is bizarre, it reminds of drawings made by patients 
with severe neurological problems 
Hypothesis 
It seems plausible that the man has never seen an elephant and that he cannot 
draw (apraxia). Severe deficits in the drawing would suggest that he is 
blind, but this contradicts the facts. How could behaving like a blind man 
and yet seeing at least contours be put into a synthesis? Could the evidence 
stem from mingling effects of different events? What was diagnostically 
known when the information that he was healthy was put on paper? 
 
26  R. Peter Hobson, Anthony Lee, Rachel Brown: Autism and congenital 
blindness, in: Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 29/1 
(1999) 45–56. 
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3.2 The panoply of participants’ answers 
Given the fact that we had to consider more than one single 
(best) conjecture per person, we calculated the statistics resulting in 
a set of 609 inferences (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Working Hypotheses About the Elephant Drawing 
 Inferences Inter-Rater- 
Reliability 
Category % of all inferences 
Mean per 
person 
Crohnbach’s 
alpha (stand.) 
Relevant inferences (hÎR) 67.2% 1.58 0.92 
Hits of the ground truth (hÎM) 0.4% 0.01 1.00 
1) Recovered from early blindness after surgery 0.0% 0.00 - 
2) Neuropsychological syndrome, undiagnosed in 1959 0.4% 0.01 1.00 
Broadsides (hÎM) 0.0% 0.00 - 
Falsely dismissed hits of the ground truth (hÏM) 0.0% 0.00 - 
Correct partial explanations (hÎM) 58.7% 1.38 0.92 
1) Has never seen an elephant 14.8% 0.35 0.93 
2) Disoriented or no visual imagination 4.4% 0.10 0.87 
3) Very bad at drawing 10.8% 0.25 0.86 
4) Badly coordinated, shaky 18.1% 0.43 0.78 
5) Proportions between human and elephant seem correct 10.7% 0.25 0.99 
Falsely dismissed partial explanations (any of 1–5) (hÏM) 2.2% 0.05 - 
Correct eliminations (hÎM) 1.7% 0.04 0.78 
1) Closed eyes or wrong hand or childlike drawing cannot 
     explain the missing head (non-misleading) 1.4% 0.03 0.86 
2) He was not blind (non-misleading) 0.3% 0.01 - 
Relevant leads in implausible inferences (hÏM) 
(false negatives) 4.1% 0.10 0.81 
1) He was blind 1.6% 0.04 1.00 
2) Had a neurological disorder  2.5% 0.06 0.48 
Coincidentally true answer based on statistics (hÎM) 0.0% 0.00 - 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Category 
 
% of infer. 
 
Mean 
 
Crohnbach’s 
Irrelevant inferences (hÏR) 32.8% 0.77 0.82 
Irrelevant hypotheses among plausible matches  
(false positives) (hÎM) 11.7% 0.28 0.91 
1) Was under drugs or alcohol 2.4% 0.06 0.98 
2) Was malingering a disorder 0.8% 0.02 - 
3) Wanted to sabotage research 6.2% 0.14 0.90 
4) Was an artist (art is free, can be bizarre) 0.8% 0.02 0.86 
5) Mouth or foot drawing, technical obstacles 1.1% 0.03 1.00 
6) Misunderstandings (e.g. meant a horse, giraffe) 0.5% 0.01 0.65 
Irrelevant eliminations, irrelevant partial 
explanations 0.0% 0.00 - 
Irrelevant implausible inferences (hÏM) 19.3% 0.45 0.85 
1) Raised in isolation, Caspar Hauser syndrome 0.3% 0.01 - 
2) Hated or tortured animals  0.8% 0.02 1.00 
3) Psychological or sexual problems, complex of inferiority 6.2% 0.15 0.78 
4) Raised in wilderness, other culture, or poverty 2.1% 0.05 - 
5) Anxious or seeking protection 2.8% 0.07 0.71 
6) Drew like a child would draw, or was told to do so 2.1% 0.05 0.82 
7) Blindfolded, stress, sloppy, wrong hand 4.8% 0.11 0.91 
Impossible (irrelevant) inferences (hÏM) 0.8% 0.02 0.71 
Vague ideas (difficult to judge or to refute) 1.0% 0.02 - 
All-encompassing ideas (non-refutables) 0.0% 0.00 - 
Good matches (Tarski) (hÎM) 72.6% 1.71 0.91 
Bad matches (Tarski) (hÏM) 27.4% 0.64 0.84 
Set of 609 inferences stated by N = 259 subjects 
 
Among the matches (n = 442) the percentage of relevant ones 
was 84% while among the non-matches (n = 167) it was 23%. Con-
sequently, the odds to pursue an irrelevant dead end were about 3 
to 1 for a non-match, while only being 1 against 5 for a match. 
Among the matching full explanations (n = 74), the percentage of 
hits of the GT was 3%. Thus, the great majority of all plausible full 
explanations (97%) went in the wrong direction. 
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Table 2 shows that inter-rater reliabilities were sufficient for the 
classification of the participants’ hypotheses within the Cartesian 
product between matches and relevance. Both our null-hypotheses 
H01 and H02 must be rejected on the basis of a counter-example. The 
elephant riddle illustrates the incommensurability of falseness. The 
hypothesis that the man was blind when he drew the animal not 
only contradicts the text of the task, it is in total opposition to the 
facts visible in the drawing. A completely sightless person could 
never have done it. Thus, an implausible inference can come close 
to the truth while being far away from the facts. Compared to the 
jurists, psychologists had a heightened awareness of difficulties 
with fine motor skills as a neurological symptom. This contradicted 
the text; however, one should be aware of the fact, that some infor-
mation previously established was true in the past but can be out-
dated in the present. 
Then again partial explanations and eliminations reflect good 
reasoning, taking small steps at a time. Plausible full inferences 
were sorted in the order of their fitting the facts. A good match, an 
inference to the best explanation, was the intoxication hypothesis. It 
provides a simple and historically possible cause according to Oc-
cam’s razor, and yet it is irrelevant for the GT. Another good match 
was «artist»: There are indeed pieces of art that seem unskilled and 
bizarre (as for instance Joseph Beuys). The psychological phenomena 
«malingering» and «sabotage» can show strange patterns but must 
not. We found the explanation of «misunderstandings about which 
animal to draw between the experimenter and the subject in 1959» 
(incidence < 2%) not as plausible as the previous conjectures, only a 
fair match. This is a compromise to limit the number of categories 
to a manageable number. Eliminations and partial explanations led 
to relevant results, but they could not detect the GT because this is 
a bold inference going beyond what can be derived from visible 
elements by laws of nature. 
Implausible or impossible conjectures (non-matches) occurred 
with an alarmingly high incidence: 42.5% of all participants had 
stated at least one of them in their hypothesis section (distributed 
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almost equally over all three groups). We attribute this result partly 
to experimental conditions which allowed only 14 minutes of work 
and made it impossible to search for more contextual information. 
It also points at the danger of interpretations based on the omission 
of clearly observable facts. Typical non-matches would ignore that 
the elephant’s legs were joined to its rump (as well as the little man’s 
limbs) and the adequate proportions. They would not consider the 
insecure hand, neither the repeated lines, nor the care to fill out 
the rump, which must have taken some time. Other implausible 
inferences contradicted everyday experience, such as: Nobody in 
his right mind would omit to draw a mammal’s head, even if they 
do not know its exact shape; it is the most prominent feature in chil-
dren’s drawings. By the same token, everyday knowledge concerns 
drawings of primitive men, which are far more skilled than the 
questioned drawing.27 
Obviously no single example can justify the application of the 
intelligence cycle which is the verisimilitude approach. But for as 
long as it is recognized as a heuristic tool and not a formal logical 
procedure it seems to be helpful in most cases. Scenarios in which 
almost all unlikely matches are indeed irrelevant must be a very 
common type of problem in practice, otherwise the fallacy of the 
verisimilitude approach would be more widely known.  
 
 
27  Cf. work of a medieval sculptor on the Basle cathedral who has never 
seen an elephant https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basler_M%C3%BCnster 
(visited 16-01-2019) 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Applying accurate perception, qualified judgement and 
ethics to complex problems 
Reasoning under uncertainty provides plenty of opportunities 
to err or to be accused of erring even if one is not. One can present 
a plausible, well-founded hypothesis, which may later be over-
turned by new evidence in a totally unexpected way. But one can 
also be accused by hindsight critics of not seeing an obvious contra-
diction of the working hypothesis with the facts, even if it were rel-
evant for detecting the unknown truth. Only after learning the 
ground truth does everything fall into place and the solution seems 
to be obvious and logical. All of a sudden it seems incomprehensible 
why professionals did not discover it much sooner.  
Some might mistake our results as a permission to say that in the 
art of interpretation «anything goes» henceforth. Such an attitude dis-
respects scientific ethics and procedure, namely the requirement that 
analyses be presented in such a way that they provide intersubjective 
observability and comprehensibility. While abandoning the naive 
idea of «the ground truth to be found out», the epistemic paradigm 
still states that interpretation must be done in a qualified way. Schum 
postulates that the observer must be honest, objective and have an 
accurate perception.28 Thus, conjectures which seem plausible only 
because they are based on sloppiness and arbitrary judgements or 
even based on deception (fabrication or omission of relevant data) are 
considered scientific misconduct. Our results speak for much more 
diligence. They also demonstrate that it is perfectly legitimate to pre-
sent an individually preferred hypothesis (even if it is a minority 
opinion) as the final conclusion about a case, if – and only if – those 
facts, which contradict the conclusion, as well as the alternative ex-
planations are not kept in the dark. Creativity and subsequent inves-
tigations must be facilitated and not impeded. 
 
28  D. A. Schum: The evidential foundations of probabilistic reasoning, 229. 
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4.2 Structuring the presentation of the intelligence drawn from 
the observandum 
The output of a natural observation in our sample was either 
an unstructured assembly of incomplete sentences and arrows, or 
else a well-edited text. The latter form of presenting an analysis is 
nice to read but hard to re-work. Any major modification requires a 
total re-write (cf. Analyses 1 and 2). A comparison to the work of 
a trained professional (Analysis 3) shows how much easier it is to 
criticize and improve the results following the structured algorithm: 
 
Analysis 3 done by a trained ♀ professional (14 min.) 
Observations 
1) Drawing made by a «normal» man. Even kids draw an elephant’s big 
ears and trunk, but not this man.  
2) Black & white drawing, no perspective. Insecure hand (poorly defined 
contours (¦  does not know what he is drawing, is unsure).  
3) Big animal (?) without head, long limbs. Next to it a person without 
limbs (no arms and legs). Legs of the elephant too thin, but very long. 
No head but two tails. 
4) Contradicts the anatomy of elephants.  
5) No head, no ears, the person’s tie seems superfluous. 
Hypothesis: 
The man has never seen an elephant. He knows that it is a big animal. Not 
more. Maybe he confounds it with a giraffe. 
 
Using the five rules provides a structured procedure and a table 
of evidence that can be criticized from all angles. Other experts can 
easily complete or improve a mediocre analysis by adding or criti-
cizing models and schemata used (rule I.) and then find more signs 
of evidence according to rules II. to V. Reasoning under uncertainty 
is a matter of discipline; like every successful endeavor in life it is 
based on one percent inspiration and 99 percent transpiration. 
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4.3 How to improve reasoning under uncertainty 
Statements like «reasoning under uncertainty is an art» are not 
helpful in practice. What can be derived from the present study to 
make into a craft? As proposed by Wagenaar, Koppen and Crom-
bag, implicit assumptions about life played an important role in 
the participants’ reasoning process.29 Our results underscore the 
necessity to make them explicit by specifying «everyday rules» and 
schemata used to back up an inference. James Reason mentions the 
retrieval of incomplete semantic knowledge as a major source of 
error.30 Few participants came up with the idea that children never 
draw animals without their heads. Teachers would certainly testify 
that they have never seen a healthy child do this, but statistics 
are unavailable. The decisive role of gathering more contextual 
knowledge about drawings and about conditions that can influence 
them is obvious.31 
We also saw that deductive partial explanations and elimina-
tions seem to be a good way of trying to find relevant answers to 
unresolved cases. When an investigation stalls, one should not 
prematurely be fixed on the full explanation of the story of what 
presumably happened but make small and coherent advances in the 
interpretation of the details of the evidence with specific sub-
hypotheses. Then again one cannot absolutely trust such deductions, 
as one does not know how the traces arrived there. Were they 
caused by the presumed incident or by random events? 
In order to collect ideas about the so-called big picture, a brain 
storming about all imaginable scenarios dipping deep into the 
sources of life-experience should be encouraged.32 The background 
 
29  Willem A. Wagenaar, Peter J. van Koppen, Hans F. M. Crombag: An-
chored narratives. Psychology of proof in criminal law, London 1993, 61, 
232, 235. 
30  James Reason: Human error, Cambridge 1990, 112. 
31  M. Pidd: Tools for thinking, 59, 97; W. A. Wagenaar et al.: Anchored nar-
ratives, 237–240. 
32  M. Pidd: op. cit., 60. 
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knowledge cannot always be found in books.33 Professionals should 
introduce their field experience and enrich the arsenal information 
but, in addition, it is also a wise choice to consult people who know 
the given social, cultural, economic, technical, natural or work-
related context. Ideas collected in the brainstorming process need to 
be bold – thus go far beyond what it visible in the evidence – other-
wise nothing new can be discovered.  
4.4 Integrating naïve recipes into hierarchical levels of 
epistemology  
The final task in order to avoid professional errors in reasoning 
under uncertainty is to provide a deeper understanding of different 
levels of methodology. The general idea of the critical thinking 
schema shown in Table 3 is to integrate the historical ideas of «truth 
finding» or positivism into several layers of reasoning. The schema 
starts on its lower levels with the everyday recipes and integrates 
them step by step into a more sophisticated methodology.34 
 
Table 3 
Levels of reasoning and perception under uncertainty from the bottom-up 
perspective 
 
4. Skepticism (meta-theory) 
Errors can result from a naïve belief in realism, correspondence theories 
and the intelligence cycle. 
 
× An interpretation of signs within their context can be a match and yet be 
mistaken.  
× An interpretation of signs can contradict the picture of signs yet come 
very close to the ground truth.  
 
33  W. A. Wagenaar et al.: Anchored narratives, 47. 
34  Here we consider only the bottom-up perspective. Its relationship with 
top-down theories, developed on a set of premises, cannot be discussed 
here. 
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3. Separation between plausible and implausible assumptions (theory) 
Positivism (Tarski/Popper): 
 
 Decision is made on higher level 
 by using a truth function about 
 correspondence. 
Semiotics (Eco/Peirce): 
 
 The meanings of a signs can only 
 be inferred within their context. 
2. Critical realism (observation) 
Early positivism (Russell): 
 
 Hypotheses need to be falsifiable 
 statements tested by something 
 outside them. 
Semiotics (Eco/Peirce): 
 
× Observation relies on signs as 
units of perception. 
× A sign is more than a signal. 
It consists of an outer form 
conveying inner meaning(s). 
1. Naïve realism (information) 
Direct perception provides information 
 
It is important to realize that none of these levels can be dis-
missed. Naïve realism states that what is there on paper under every-
body’s eyes cannot be ignored. This is called evidence. If obvious 
signals were omitted, important information about the observanda 
could be entirely lost or certain aspects could be systematically se-
lected with a bias favoring the observer’s own opinion (so-called 
cherry-picking). The result of disregarding facts could also amount 
to sophistries and petitio principii. If the second level of distinguish-
ing signs from signals were not respected, then some up-front 
meanings could falsely be taken for granted and the formal aspects 
of signs cannot sufficiently be perceived. If hypotheses were not 
stated as falsifiable sentences, then vagueness and ambiguity easily 
set in (as the experiment has shown). They provide no further 
insights. Allowing vagueness and ambiguity has the side effect to 
open up the debate to rhetorical pirouettes favoring biases and dis-
torting the picture in the readers’ reception. The necessity of a test 
level for the plausibility of any theory about an incident is also 
obvious. It distinguishes qualified from unqualified beliefs and 
 H. Haas, M. Djordjevic, A. van Ackere: Reasoning under uncertainty 51 
provides the grounds for critical discussions and brainstorming. 
Eco’s warning prevents from committing the Bible code fallacy of 
recomposing signs out of their context in order to create an arbitrary 
mosaic. Then again, the testing theories-level cannot be the last 
word about the result of an analysis done under complete uncer-
tainty as has shown our experiment with the elephant case. While 
the diligence of a given analysis can be established and praised, its 
results must still be subjected to some skepticism. 
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